New York's medical malpractice statute of limitations, defined under CPLR § 214-a, establishes a 2.5-year filing deadline measured from the date of the alleged negligent act or from the last treatment where continuous treatment applies. Unlike most jurisdictions, New York does not recognize a general discovery rule; accrual occurs on the date of the negligent conduct, regardless of when the patient learns of the injury. Two narrow exceptions apply to discovery-based accrual: foreign objects and failure to diagnose cancer or malignant tumors.
This article explains New York's timing requirements, including discovery exceptions for foreign objects and cancer misdiagnosis, qualifying tolling doctrines, and recent appellate decisions affecting medical malpractice claims.
Core Rules for Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York
The following rules govern filing deadlines, discovery accrual, repose periods, and the distinction between professional negligence and other claim types under CPLR § 214-a.
Deadline Structure
CPLR § 214-a mandates that medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice actions be commenced within two years and six months of the act, omission, or failure complained of, or from the date of last treatment where continuous treatment exists for the same illness, injury, or condition giving rise to the claim. This framework applies to claims against physicians, hospitals, dentists, podiatrists, and other licensed healthcare providers rendering professional services.
Statute of Repose Provisions
New York imposes separate repose periods depending on claim type. For cancer and malignant tumor misdiagnosis claims, CPLR § 214-a establishes an absolute seven-year outer limit from the date of the negligent act. CPLR § 208 creates a ten-year statute of repose applicable to claims subject to infancy or mental incapacity tolling. For foreign object cases, CPLR § 214-a provides no statute of repose.
Discovery Rule Requirements
New York's restrictive approach to discovery-based accrual distinguishes it from most jurisdictions. As the Court of Appeals held in Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hospital (1996), absent a foreign object or cancer discovery rule exception, medical malpractice claims accrue on the date of the alleged negligent act rather than when the plaintiff discovers the injury.
Two statutory exceptions permit discovery-based accrual:
- Foreign objects: Claims may be filed within one year of discovery of a foreign object negligently left in the body. This exception applies only to unintended objects left during surgery and excludes chemical compounds, fixation devices, and prosthetic aids. In Rodriguez v. Manhattan Medical Group, 77 N.Y.2d 217 (1990), the Court of Appeals held that intentionally implanted devices such as IUDs and stents constitute "fixation devices" rather than "foreign objects."
- Cancer misdiagnosis: Claims must be filed within 2.5 years from when the patient knows or reasonably should have known both the negligent act and that it caused injury, subject to a seven-year absolute statute of repose.
Scope of Professional Negligence
The determination of whether an action constitutes medical malpractice requires analysis of whether the alleged negligence involves medical skill and training to assess. When alleged negligence in performing or interpreting medical procedures requires specialized medical knowledge, the claim is properly characterized as medical malpractice subject to CPLR § 214-a's 2.5-year limitations period.
When CPLR § 214-a Does Not Apply
Actions alleging unauthorized medical procedures without patient consent constitute battery claims subject to the one-year limitation period under CPLR § 215(3) rather than the 2.5-year malpractice period under CPLR § 214-a.
Tolling Exceptions That Affect Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York
New York recognizes four tolling doctrines, each subject to restrictive judicial interpretation and a ten-year outer limit for claims involving minority or incapacity.
1. Minority/Infancy Tolling
CPLR § 208 tolls the statute of limitations for plaintiffs under age 18 at the time the cause of action accrues. However, the limitation period is subject to an absolute ten-year statute of repose from the date of the alleged malpractice. This means a child injured at age five would have until age fifteen to file, not age 20.5, because the ten-year cap controls.
2. Mental Incapacity Tolling
CPLR § 208 provides tolling for plaintiffs who are mentally incapacitated at the time the cause of action accrues. The incapacity must be severe enough to prevent the plaintiff from managing their own affairs or protecting their legal rights. Tolling continues while the disability persists, subject to the same ten-year absolute cap.
3. Fraudulent Concealment
Equitable estoppel through fraudulent concealment may toll the limitation period when a defendant actively conceals malpractice through intentional conduct. Established in Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442 (1978), this equitable doctrine requires the plaintiff to establish intentional concealment through affirmative acts, causation between the concealment and delayed filing, and reasonable reliance on the concealment.
4. Continuous Treatment Doctrine
The continuous treatment doctrine tolls the statute of limitations when a patient receives ongoing treatment for the same illness, injury, or condition that gave rise to the alleged malpractice. Three prerequisites must be satisfied:
- The patient sought and received continuous treatment.
- The treatment was for the same condition underlying the malpractice claim.
- The treatment was continuous, with no significant gaps.
Courts evaluate whether gaps break continuity based on the totality of circumstances, including whether both parties reasonably anticipated future treatment for the same condition.
The Court of Appeals in Lohnas v. Luzi, 30 N.Y.3d 752 (2018) clarified that even gaps exceeding 30 months do not necessarily terminate continuous treatment if there is evidence of an ongoing treatment relationship and expectation of further care for the same condition.
How New York Courts Interpret Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations Rules
Recent appellate decisions address continuous treatment gaps, termination of treatment relationships, professional negligence scope, and the battery-malpractice distinction.
Rich v. Lavelle — Continuous Treatment Despite Treatment Gaps
The Appellate Division, Third Department, in Rich v. Lavelle (2023) reversed dismissal where a 16-month gap existed between treatments. The court found triable issues regarding the continuous treatment doctrine applicability, holding that questions of fact remained about whether the physician and patient reasonably anticipated continued treatment for the same condition.
The plaintiff alleged malpractice in the management of a spinal condition, with treatment visits occurring intermittently over several years. The defendant argued the 16-month gap conclusively broke continuity, but the court disagreed. Evidence that the physician scheduled follow-up appointments and both parties understood the treatment relationship to be ongoing created factual disputes inappropriate for summary judgment resolution.
Ferrara-Carpenter v. Ormsby — Termination of Treatment Relationship
The Appellate Division, Third Department, in Ferrara-Carpenter v. Ormsby (2024), affirmed dismissal where the patient explicitly terminated the treatment relationship due to loss of trust. The court established that continuous treatment requires ongoing care where the patient continues to seek treatment from the same provider for the same condition.
The plaintiff had informed the defendant physician that she no longer wished to continue treatment, ending the relationship before the alleged malpractice was discovered. The court held that a patient's unilateral termination of the treatment relationship ends the continuous treatment tolling period, regardless of whether the physician would have continued providing care. This decision clarifies that the doctrine protects ongoing therapeutic relationships, not situations where the patient has affirmatively ended the provider relationship.
Fallon v. Five Star Management Services, LLC — Scope of Medical Malpractice
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Fallon v. Five Star Management Services, LLC (2024) held that spirometry testing performed during a workers' compensation evaluation constituted medical malpractice subject to CPLR § 214-a rather than ordinary negligence.
The plaintiff argued the claim sounded in ordinary negligence with a three-year limitation period, but the court disagreed. The court reasoned that administering and interpreting spirometry tests requires medical training and judgment about proper technique, patient positioning, and result analysis. Claims alleging improper performance of such testing necessarily implicate professional medical standards, triggering CPLR § 214-a's 2.5-year limitation period regardless of the non-clinical setting in which the testing occurred.
Young v. Sethi — Battery vs. Malpractice Classification
The Appellate Division, Third Department, in Young v. Sethi (2020) held that medical procedures performed without patient consent constitute battery claims subject to the one-year limitation under CPLR § 215(3), not the 2.5-year malpractice period under CPLR § 214-a.
The plaintiff alleged the defendant performed a medical procedure beyond the scope of consent provided. The court distinguished between claims challenging how a procedure was performed (malpractice) and claims challenging whether authorization existed to perform the procedure at all (battery). This classification applies regardless of whether negligence also occurred during the procedure's performance, meaning plaintiffs alleging unauthorized procedures face a significantly shorter filing window.
Recent Updates to Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations Laws in New York
Senate Bill S6192, effective April 3, 2023, amended CPLR § 214-a to create an extended limitation period for malpractice actions against hospitals failing to file incident reports required under PHL § 2805-l. Actions may be commenced within one year of the date the incident report was required to be filed. This provision applies when hospitals fail to comply with mandatory incident reporting requirements, regardless of whether individual practitioners filed separate reports. The amendment also requires hospitals to send copies of incident reports to affected patients and their legal representatives.
Senate Bill S4225 remains pending in the 2025-2026 legislative session, proposing further refinement of the hospital incident report provisions. The fundamental 2.5-year framework remains unchanged for standard medical malpractice actions.
What This Means for Medical Malpractice Filing Deadlines in New York
New York's 2.5-year limitation period runs from the date of the negligent act unless continuous treatment tolling applies or one of the narrow discovery exceptions governs. The absence of a general discovery rule requires prompt investigation of potential claims.
Proper deadline calculation depends on accurate identification of treatment dates and analysis of whether tolling doctrines or discovery exceptions apply. Legal AI tools support this work by organizing medical records and building defensible chronologies tied to statutory deadlines.
Explore Tavrn's legal technology solutions.
.webp)
.webp)
